Corporate Cyborgs and Technology Risks by Matwyshyn, Andrea M.
Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology 
Volume 11 Issue 2 Article 6 
2010 
Corporate Cyborgs and Technology Risks 
Andrea M. Matwyshyn 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mjlst 
Recommended Citation 
Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Corporate Cyborgs and Technology Risks, 11 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 573 (2010). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mjlst/vol11/iss2/6 
The Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology is published by the 
University of Minnesota Libraries Publishing. 
Matwyshyn AM. Corporate Cyborgs and Technology Risks. 
Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology. 
2010;11(2):573-98. 
573 
Corporate Cyborgs and Technology Risks 
Andrea M. Matwyshyn* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The law has long treated corporations as persons with 
rights, and it continues to expand this treatment.1 In a similar 
vein, in technology contexts, the practical differentiation 
between human persons and corporate persons grows tenuous 
in many respects. Today’s corporations seem more enmeshed in 
our daily reality, more anthropomorphic and “friendly.” The 
local radio station wants to be your Facebook friend. The 
Twitter feed of your favorite coffee chain intermingles with 
feeds authored by your human friends. Internally, however, 
corporations are becoming progressively less “human”; they are 
relying less upon the particular human employees that fill the 
physical space of the corporate headquarters and relying more 
upon their information systems. This seeming contradiction of 
internal mechanization with external humanization calls to 
mind the metaphor of a “cyborg”—a hybrid creature that is part 
machine and part human. 
This shift in corporate identity toward a cyborg identity 
warrants new legal consideration: the shift has carried with it 
technology driven risks to both individual entities and the 
economy as a whole. This article argues that, as companies 
progressively shift to a blended human-machine identity, 
dangers lurk from overzealous technology adoption without 
strong audit mechanisms and oversight. Historical examples 
warn us that organizations sometimes adopt technology 
overzealously, prior to the consideration of the full implications 
of this adoption. Using the securities industry as a case study 
                                                          
 2010 Andrea M. Matwyshyn. 
* Andrea M. Matwyshyn is an Assistant Professor of Legal Studies & Business 
Ethics at The Wharton School at University of Pennsylvania. She can be 
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 1. See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 
(2010). 
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of cyborg transformation, this article points to the historical 
example of the Books and Records Crisis that plagued the 
securities markets in the 1960s and 1970s and required SEC 
intervention. Drawing lessons about technology 
mismanagement from this crisis, it raises questions regarding 
today’s technology reliant corporations. In particular, this 
article raises questions with regard to information 
management and information security. The piece concludes by 
calling for an information accountability regime with more 
meaningful internal and external corporate oversight that more 
effectively blends regimes of corporate, securities, contract, 
intellectual property, tort and criminal law. 
II.  THE RISE OF THE CORPORATE CYBORG: 
MECHANICAL INTERIOR WITH A HUMAN FACE 
Cyborgs have been a fixture in science fiction literature,2 
movies,3 and technology theory for decades.4 Part machine and 
part human, they embody two types of creatures. On the one 
hand, cyborgs can be humans who have extended their 
capabilities through technology enhancement to their bodies, 
such as two professors who have surgically attached various 
gadgetry to their bodies.5 On the other hand, cyborgs can be 
machines that have a decidedly human appearance and are 
capable of generating human emotional connections to them, 
such as the fictional Terminator from the movie series of the 
same name.6 Corporations today appear to be evolving into this 
second type of cyborg—a machine with a human appearance 
capable of generating emotional connections. 
                                                          
 2. See, e.g., MARTIN CAIDIN, CYBORG (1972). 
 3. Perhaps the most widely recognizable cyborg character from popular 
culture is that of Arnold Schwarzenegger’s Terminator character from the 
movie series of the same name. The Terminator appeared as a human to the 
outside world in a conventionally attractive physical form and functioned 
relatively effectively in a world of humans in pursuing its goals. It was also 
capable of winning humans’ trust. However, upon closer examination, his 
behaviors gave away the truth of his interior: he was, first and foremost, a 
machine programmed with certain preferences and directions. THE 
TERMINATOR (Orion Pictures 1984). 
 4. For a discussion of cyborg theory, see generally CHRIS GRAY, THE 
CYBORG HANDBOOK (1995). 
 5. See, e.g., Lisa Guernsey, At Airport Gate, A Cyborg Unplugged, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 14, 2002, at G4; Kevin Warwick, The University of Reading, 
http://www.kevinwarwick.com/ (last visited March 10, 2010). 
 6. THE TERMINATOR, supra note 3. 
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As the types of assets that dominate many companies have 
moved away from tangibles toward intangibles,7 corporate 
structure has also evolved. Internally, a corporation 
conceptualizes itself as a type of machine—a series of 
overlapping information networks, both human and 
technological. Externally, a corporation seeks to be viewed as a 
trusted (human) friend to maximize its goodwill. Internal 
corporate information flows are increasingly mechanized 
through computerization; externally, however, corporations 
work to maintain a human face to build brand and customer 
loyalty. On one hand, companies are struggling with growing 
into heavily technology-driven structures of information 
management,8 but on the other, they still view the external 
projection of human characteristics as being of foremost 
business importance. 
A.  INTERNAL MECHANIZATION 
Companies are increasingly internally mechanized; 
information management and computer systems are driving 
dramatic change inside companies. Businesses have become 
progressively more technology-centric and, consequently, 
organized in large part around their unifying computer 
systems. Since Time Magazine named “The Computer” as its 
person of the year in 1983,9 corporations’ reliance on 
information systems has increased significantly, as have the 
capabilities of those systems. This integration of information 
technology into corporate operations during the last two 
decades has changed the ways that companies handle 
information—both sensitive internal information and 
personally identifiable consumer information.10 
                                                          
 7. For example, goodwill alone frequently makes up over 15 percent of 
corporate assets in large companies. Get Out the Red Pen, BARRON’S, Feb. 16, 
2009, 
http://online.barrons.com/article/SB123457702581886857.html?mod=wsjcrmai
n. 
 8. See Jim Carr, From RSA: Financial Services Companies Struggling 
with Multichannel Authentication, SC MAGAZINE, Apr. 10, 2008, 
http://www.scmagazineus.com/From-RSA-Financial-services-companies-
struggling-with-multichannel-authentication/article/108906/. 
 9. Cover, TIME, Jan. 3, 1983, available at 
http://www.time.com/time/covers/0,16641,19830103,00.html. 
 10. Further, as internet purchases became a regular part of consumer 
economic behaviors in the late 1990s, a new economic environment emerged. 
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Companies have increasingly centralized sensitive 
corporate information:11 trade secret information,12 financial 
information,13 business partner and customer information is 
centralized in companies’ internal computer systems. This 
centralization arose because businesses sought to solve 
communication problems among various parts of the company, 
and overcoming these communication obstacles across 
machines became a corporate priority for many organizations.14 
The goal was, therefore, to allow all parts of the organization to 
effectively interact with each other and communicate internal 
data.15 Business communications progressively shifted from 
                                                          
The defining characteristic of this new commercial environment has been 
widespread corporate collection, aggregation, and leveraging of personally 
identifiable consumer data with the assistance of information systems. 
Consumers increasingly venture online to engage in information-sensitive 
activities, such as checking bank balances or transmitting credit card 
information in connection with purchases. See SUSANNAH FOX ET AL., TRUST 
AND PRIVACY ONLINE: WHY AMERICANS WANT TO REWRITE THE RULES 13, 15 
(2000), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2000/PIP_Trust_Privacy_R
eport.pdf. Many companies today hoard data for marketing and other 
purposes. They collect as much information as possible about their customers 
in the name of targeting products more effectively and generating secondary 
streams of revenue through licensing their databases of consumer information. 
H.R. Rep. No. 106-74, pt. 3, at 106–07 (1999). 
 11. For example, most law firms use document management systems to 
centralize work product. For a discussion of document management software, 
see Dennis Kennedy & John Gelagin, Want to Save 16 Minutes Every Day?, 
FINDLAW, Feb. 1, 2003, 
http://technology.findlaw.com/resources/scripts/printer_friendly.pl?page=//artic
les/00006/009973.html. This use of information technology serves to facilitate 
knowledge management, the sharing of institutional intellectual resources 
such as form contracts, and control over access to certain information. Id. 
 12. For a discussion of the risks that trade secret information faces from 
technology, see, for example, Elizabeth A. Rowe, Saving Trade Secret 
Disclosures on the Internet Through Sequential Preservation, 2007 B.C. 
INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F. 091101, at 4 (2007), 
http://bciptf.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=31&Itemid=30
. 
 13. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act specifically considers the implications of 
corporate uses of financial information. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. 
No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified in scattered sections of 12 and 15 
U.S.C.). 
 14. These attempts to centralize built in high dependencies between 
systems. See, e.g., Wayne Labs, Machine Control: Still Islands of Automation?, 
FOOD ENGINEERING, Jan. 2006, at 97, 97–99. 
 15. In the context of manufacturing, this meant connecting up “islands of 
automation” into a single communication network. See id. 
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real space to virtual space,16 and entirely new technology-
contingent information businesses have arisen, such as eBay 
and Google.17 Even the most traditional of companies began to 
experiment with internet sales through company websites. 
Increasing computerization and automation of businesses 
generated enterprise-wide computing. 
B.  EXTERNAL HUMANIZATION 
Corporations have gone to great lengths to 
anthropomorphize their images in order to generate consumer 
trust and brand loyalty. They engage in philanthropy18 and 
advertise in ways that are intended to create interpersonal 
connection between the brand and the customer. Recently, 
these advertising outreach efforts have extended to social 
networking websites such as Facebook. In 2008, approximately 
$1.6 billion was spent on U.S. online social network 
advertisements.19 Business enterprises have pages,20 friends,21 
fans,22 and send and receive messages through social networks; 
they participate as any human would. If content creation can 
be used to judge impact, these personification efforts appear to 
                                                          
 16. See, e.g., Ed Frauenheim, Report: E-mail Volume Grows Rapidly, 
CNET NEWS, Oct. 2, 2003, http://news.com.com/2110-1032-
5085956.html?tag=3Dnefd_hed (last visited May 7, 2010) (noting an 80% 
growth in volume of corporate email between 2002 and 2003). 
 17. Sharon K. Sandeen, The Sense and Nonsense of Website Terms of Use 
Agreements, 26 HAMLINE L. REV. 499, 508 (2003). As a consequence of this 
transformation, numerous state corporate statutes have been amended to 
allow for email notice, virtual shareholder meetings, and internet proxy 
voting. Gary W. Derrick & Irving L. Faught, New Developments in Oklahoma 
Business Entity Law, 56 OKLA. L. REV. 259, 263 (2003); Robert C. Pozen, 
Institutional Perspectives on Shareholder Nominations of Corporation 
Directors, 59 BUS. LAW. 95, 102–03 (2003). 
 18. See, e.g., Terry Timm Moos, Cisco Systems Honored with 2005 
Excellence in Corporate Philanthropy Award, (Feb. 27, 2006), 
http://newsroom.cisco.com/dlls/2006/hd_022706b.html. 
 19. Rachael King, Building a Brand with Widgets, BUSINESSWEEK, Mar. 
3, 2008, 
http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/feb2008/tc20080303_000743
_page_2.htm. 
 20. See, e.g., Facebook: Starbucks, http://www.facebook.com/Starbucks 
(last visited Mar. 9, 2010). 
 21. See, e.g., Boystown Live, http://www.boystownlive.com (last visited 
Mar. 9, 2010). 
 22. Ben and Jerry’s has over one million fans on Facebook. See Facebook: 
Ben & Jerry’s Homemade, Inc., http://www.facebook.com/benjerry (last visited 
Mar. 9, 2010). 
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be working—hundreds of user generated pages about 
companies,23 products,24 corporate officers25 and corporate 
characters have been created.26 Corporate “characters” or 
branded mascots, in particular, have engendered numerous 
hate groups27 and fan groups28 where people discuss their 
emotional reactions to these characters, just as they do with 
regard to human celebrities.29 For example, the change of the 
eTrade spokesbaby during the 2010 Superbowl resulted in an 
almost instantaneous internet outcry.30 These technology-based 
extensions of the corporate person are becoming increasingly 
important in marketing efforts and goodwill generation. The 
last fifteen years have brought a dramatic transformation to 
the structure, outreach and internal dynamics of companies. In 
1995, internet browsers were a novelty. In 2010, almost every 
company feels compelled to maintain an internet presence and 
offer multiple technology-aided forms of communication. No 
                                                          
 23. See, e.g., Facebook: Microsoft, 
http://www.facebook.com/Microsoft?ref=search&sid=100000695049406.103344
7816..1 (last visited Mar. 10, 2010). 
 24. See, e.g., Facebook: i am a pc and ……SHUT UP!!, http://en-
gb.facebook.com/pages/i-am-a-pc-and-SHUT-UP/321665282894 (last visited 
Mar. 10, 2010). 
 25. See, e.g., Facebook: I HATE BILL GATES, 
http://www.facebook.com/group.php?gid=4836749570&ref=search&sid=100000
695049406.3743157703..1 (last visited Mar. 10, 2010). 
 26. See, e.g., Facebook: E*TRADE Baby, 
http://www.facebook.com/search/?q=etrade+baby&init=quick#!/etradebaby?ref
=search&sid=1247199379.932930107..1 (last visited Mar. 15, 2010). 
 27. See, e.g., Facebook: I hate Clippy, 
http://www.facebook.com/search/?flt=1&q=clippy&o=65&sid=605538877.20023
31308..1&s=0#!/group.php?gid=303574911105&ref=search&sid=605538877.19
87303274..1 (last visited Mar. 10, 2010). 
 28. See, e.g., Facebook: R.I.P. Clippy 1997-2007, 
http://www.facebook.com/pages/RIP-Clippy-The-Microsoft-Paper-
Clip/103394899696284 (last visited Mar. 10, 2010). 
 29. See, e.g., Facebook: Lady Gaga, http://www.facebook.com/ladygaga 
(last visited Mar. 15, 2010). 
 30. See, e.g., Tanya Irwin, New Etrade ‘Baby’ Arrives During Super Bowl, 
MEDIADAILYNEWS, Jan. 15, 2010, 
http://www.mediapost.com/publications/?fa=Articles.showArticle&art_aid=120
739; James Poniewozik, James Brown Takes One for the Team, TUNED IN (Jan. 
25, 2010, 10:05 AM), http://tunedin.blogs.time.com/2010/01/25/james-brown-
takes-one-for-the-team/; digitalLouisville.com, What Louisville Is Saying 
About… E-trade, http://www.digitalouisville.com/keyword/e-trade (last visited 
Mar. 9, 2010); Love the E Trade Baby, 
http://www.experienceproject.com/groups/Love-The-E-Trade-Baby/193839 (last 
visited Mar. 9, 2010). 
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longer are consumers simply reading advertisements; they are 
interacting with companies in many of the same ways they 
interact with humans online. Real time chat agents are 
available for immediate questions.31 Call centers frequently 
staffed by agents, even if located in another country, are a 
Skype call away. Consumers increasingly feel that even feel 
that companies are “following” them too closely using 
technological means online—much like a nosy neighbor or a 
paparazzo might in real life.32 
As one might assume, a fundamental tension exists 
between these two trends of progressive mechanization and 
simultaneous humanization. This tension, consequently, is 
leading to management failures. However, unlike most other 
types of management failures, information management 
failures frequently negatively impact not only the entity itself, 
but also negatively impact other technologically-connected 
entities.33 Thus this tension in corporate cyborg identity has 
given rise to new information privacy, security and legal 
concerns. 
III.  TECHNOLOGY RISKS, FAILS, AND CORPORATE 
CYBORGS 
Although companies are aggressively marching forward in 
their technology adoption and reliance, they sometimes neglect 
to build the internal management infrastructure necessary to 
use new technologies responsibly. These management failures 
result in ignoring or unwittingly assuming significant 
technology risks that can meaningfully damage corporate 
assets and goodwill. In other words, technology 
mismanagement can undercut companies’ own efforts as 
anthropomorphized identities. One industry that provides an 
example of this corporate struggle between mechanization and 
                                                          
 31. See, e.g., Dell – Hardware Chat, 
http://support.dell.com/support/topics/global.aspx/support/chat/hardware_chat
?c=us&cs=19&l=en&s=dhs (last visited Apr. 25, 2010). 
 32. Douglas MacMillan, Facebook Privacy Policies Draw Criticism by 15 
Consumer Groups, May 6, 2010, BUSINESSWEEK, 
 http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-05-06/facebook-privacy-policies-
draw-criticism-by-15-consumer-groups.html (last visited May 7, 2010). 
 33. For a discussion of the “shared secret” nature of information and the 
transitive effects of data breaches, see, e.g., Cem Paya, Quasi-secrets, Chapter 
9 in ANDREA MATWYSHYN (ED.), HARBORING DATA (2009). 
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humanization is the securities industry. 
A.  THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY BOOKS AND RECORDS CRISIS: A 
CASE STUDY OF “FAILS” 
In technology slang, the term FAIL refers to an impressive 
failure—meaning a failure that is impressive for all the wrong 
reasons. Frequently preceded by the word “epic,”34 a FAIL is 
used to describe events evidencing an extraordinary level of 
incompetence, stupidity or bad luck.35 However, the original 
use of the word “fail” actually referred to a failed securities 
transaction during a notorious and embarrassing period in 
securities history known as the Books and Records Crisis. The 
Crisis was marked by extreme levels of technology 
mismanagement and deficient risk assessment: as new 
technology was introduced on exchanges and within 
brokerages, a clash between new computerized elements and 
the preexisting human elements resulted. The Books and 
Records Crisis served as a harbinger of the struggles of today’s 
corporate cyborgs. 
1. The History of the Crisis 
The Books and Record Crisis refers to the 1967–1971 
period where over five billion dollars worth of “fails”—trades 
that were not properly settled36—threatened to destabilize the 
securities industry and exchanges.37 Described by industry 
insiders as a “terrifying and unending nightmare,”38 the crisis 
arose in part because the securities industry failed to 
successfully evolve in response to the introduction of the critical 
pieces of technology by the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), 
which resulted in greatly increased trading volume.39 While 
                                                          
 34. For examples of epic FAILS, see FAIL Blog, http://failblog.org/ (last 
visited March 9, 2010). 
 35. See id. 
 36. Brokers were required to deliver physical certificates that were signed 
and notarized within five days of executing a trade to “settle” the trade. 
Because of the complexity of the bureaucratic process required post-trade, 
certificates frequently failed to materialize by the deadline. Wyatt Wells, 
Certificates and Computers: The Remaking of Wall Street, 1967 to 1971, 74 
BUS. HIST. REV. 193, 203 (2000). 
 37. Id. at 203–07. 
 38. These were the words of a partner in a Chicago brokerage. Id. at 207. 
 39. These technologies included the 900 Ticker, the radio paging system, 
and the full automation of floor data in 1964–1966. See NYSE Euronext, 
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brokerages struggled to maintain trusted relationships with 
clients, their internal technology mismanagement undercut 
these efforts. This crisis resulted in significant part from the 
overzealous implementation and use of new technology on 
exchanges and in brokerages without considering the risks and 
outcomes. In the words of one author, the brokerage houses 
reflected “scarcity of individuals of managerial ability and 
talent” and many of the largest brokerages lacked any system 
of internal audits.40 Thus, when new trading technologies 
started to be introduced on exchanges, firms could not 
successfully adapt to handle record trading volume post-trade, 
and, in 1968, record trading volume on exchanges and in over-
the-counter markets began to outstrip brokerage houses’ ability 
to keep up in their records. Brokerage houses began trading at 
rates faster than their own employees could settle the 
transactions post-trade.41 Instead of investing in expansion or 
cutting down trading rates to a level the firms could settle, 
many brokerages simply chose to ignore the problem and 
continue trading. Aggressive trading was perceived to be the 
best strategy for securing large returns;42 the rest of operations 
were deemed a lower priority. 
Records of brokerages became plagued with the notation 
“DK” which stood for “Don’t Know about the transaction,” 
indicating that errors existed somewhere in the trading 
process. Even brokerages that worked to keep their records in 
order were negatively affected by the inadequacies of other 
firms. Because firms traded with each other regularly on an 
exchange floor and over the counter, if one broker’s failed 
recordkeeping resulted in the inability to settle a trade, both 
brokers suffered a “fail.”43 In the words of one study, “[t]he 
operations sins of one company were visited upon others.”44 
                                                          
Timeline, http://www.nyse.com/about/history/timeline_1960_1979_index.html 
(last visited Mar. 15, 2010). 
 40. Wells, supra note 36, at 198. 
 41. An antiquated system of transferring ownership existed: stock 
certificates needed to be signed, notarized and physically transferred. Brokers 
needed to process this paperwork and keep accurate records on transfers. The 
purchase or sale of a single security might require as many as sixty-eight 
separate tasks and an error anywhere in the process would result in a failed 
transaction. Id. at 201. 
 42. Id. at 200–01. 
 43. Id. at 206. 
 44. Id. at 207. 
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Although NYSE began to urge members to correct their 
internal problems, by the spring of 1968, the SEC reached the 
conclusion that inadequate pressure existed to motivate firms 
to rectify backlogs of failed trades.45 In July 1968, the SEC 
asserted that “[i]t is a violation of the anti-fraud provisions of 
the federal securities laws . . . for a broker to buy a security . . . 
for a customer if the broker-dealer has reason to believe that he 
will not be able to deliver the security.”46 Despite the threats of 
regulatory action, firms continued to insist that they could 
meet their obligations and adapt their operations to new 
technologies. It became apparent, however, that these 
assertions were, at best, irrationally optimistic when NYSE 
sent its own staff to audit some of the delinquent firms. NYSE 
later used its own funds to shut down some of these brokerages 
when these audits demonstrated large scale improprieties and 
deficits in management.47 
The firms that were not shut down by the exchange and 
SEC regulators turned to computerization of records to solve 
the recordkeeping debacles.48 These firms viewed computers as 
a panacea—the “magic solution”49 to solve their prior failures in 
management. However, few insiders actually knew how to use 
the new machines effectively, and they failed to understand 
their limitations.50 Computers were not capable of restoring 
order to years of recordkeeping chaos; they were limited in 
their organizational ability by the humans who used them. In 
the words of technologists, “Garbage in, garbage out.”51 
Further, serious software malfunctions exacerbated the 
difficulty of the automation process,52 and firms sometimes 
began relying on computer systems before these systems had 
been properly vetted for malfunctions.53 In line with this overly 
exuberant reliance on the new machines, firms dismissed some 
of their senior clerks, causing glitches to result in even more 
serious problems in the books. In the words of the SEC, “[w]hen 
                                                          
 45. Id. at 208. 
 46. Id. at 209. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 210. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
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firms . . . began to automate, they experienced substantial 
problems.”54 In the case of one brokerage, it was a computer 
error concealing approximately $7.5 million in liabilities that 
caused the SEC to demand immediate corrective action55 and 
ultimately led to the firm’s demise.56 In summary, only 
computers could process the new volumes of transactions, but 
they were costly and only as good as their operators and 
programmers. Further, small firms could not afford to 
automate with computers.57 This group of factors led to a period 
of consolidation among firms58 and to billions of dollars of 
mishandled trades that were never entirely straightened out. 
As a result of the Crisis, the Securities Investor Protection 
Corporation, a government-owned corporation, was created. 59 
2.  Lessons from the Crisis 
The Books and Records Crisis can be analyzed as a 
harbinger of the types of severe systemic consequences 
technology mismanagement can cause in data intensive 
industries; these risks are amplified for today’s cyborg 
corporations. Specifically, analysis of the Books and Records 
Crisis offers six lessons. First, technology adoption choices and 
management by an interconnected business partner impacts 
every member of the web of interconnection. When NYSE 
adopted new technologies that dramatically expanded trading 
volume capability, it resulted in a technology-driven ripple 
effect in the brokerages that were interconnected with the 
exchange. Mismanaged brokerages’ internal technology failures 
destabilized the recordkeeping of other brokerages, including 
the records of brokerages that were well-managed. 
Second, when financial incentives to hide technology 
inadequacy are significant, firms will sometimes lie about the 
                                                          
 54. Id. at 211 (quoting Securities Market Agencies: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. On Commerce and Finance of the H. Comm. on Interstate and 
Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong. 143 (1969)). 
 55. Id. at 228. 
 56. Id. at 233. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 234. 
 59. SIPC is governed by a seven-member board, with members appointed 
by the Treasury secretary, the chair of the Federal Reserve Board and the 
President. It was funded by a levy on securities transactions and was 
supported by a $1 billion line of credit from the federal treasury. Three 
members of the board were to come from the securities industry. Id. at 226. 
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extent of their managerial competence. Firms may believe it to 
be in their self-interest to knowingly or recklessly exacerbate 
harm to the other members of the interconnected web of 
companies and to individual consumers. Audit and regulatory 
oversight is essential to preserving accurate information. In the 
case of the Crisis, firms asserted their ability to rectify trades 
in the face of evidence to the contrary until independent NYSE 
and SEC auditors confirmed otherwise. 
Third, automation and technology are never a panacea; 
they are always limited by the human error and skill of the 
people who build and maintain systems. As firms turned to 
technology during the Crisis to solve their inability to settle 
trades on the back end, they realized that their prior 
limitations of imperfect recordkeeping could not be rectified by 
computers. Programming and data entry errors came with 
financial consequences. 
Fourth, companies should always expect new technologies 
to fail and be prepared to compensate with redundancy 
measures. Thus, a business strategy predicated on perfect 
implementation and operation of a computer system will 
inevitably lead to large scale failure. When computer errors 
occurred during brokerages’ implementation of new systems, 
because the senior clerks with the requisite knowledge to 
otherwise compensate for the lost data had been fired, no 
backup system existed. The results were multi-million dollar 
computer errors that could have been mitigated with a backup 
system. 
Fifth, dramatic changes in technology always create 
winners and losers, frequently driven by specialized knowledge 
and capital resources. The most dangerous failure in technology 
implementation is a failure to accurately assess knowledge 
deficits inside an organization. As many brokerages found out 
when they failed during the Crisis, businesses that incorrectly 
analyze management deficits and risks may not survive 
dramatic technological change. Further, technology evolution is 
capital intensive and leads to elimination of small firms that 
lack the corporate coffers to automate to the extent of large 
firms. 
Finally, regulatory responses can be successful. As the 
SEC’s response to the Crisis demonstrates, the destabilizing 
effect of new technologies can be mitigated through thoughtful 
oversight and audit. The key to regulatory response is 
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identifying problems early. 
B.  CORPORATE CYBORGS AND INFORMATION SECURITY 
The technology management deficits of today’s corporate 
cyborgs are perhaps most immediately visible in the context of 
information security and intangible asset management. 
Companies are processing sensitive information about 
themselves and their customers, relying on their computer 
systems to a high degree, but these companies are 
simultaneously plagued by human errors—errors in 
programming and errors in technology management. Rather 
than projecting the “trustworthy” human face they seek to 
project, companies frequently unintentionally generate an 
untrustworthy one. Shortfalls in corporate information security 
and data handling practices illustrate this tension and its 
unintended negative consequences. Empirical data from 
surveys of corporate officers60 and rampant data breaches of 
millions of records in 2009 speak for themselves—even the 
most sophisticated companies demonstrate widespread 
inadequacies in information security management.61 
Meanwhile, as the recent hacking of Google and approximately 
thirty other technology companies demonstrates,62 not even the 
                                                          
 60. Empirical data demonstrates that companies are not anticipating and 
managing information risk. For example, in 2008 in an annual information 
security survey by PriceWaterhouseCoopers of over 7,000 respondents who 
comprised CEOs, CFOs, CIOs, CSOs, vice presidents and directors of IT and 
information security from 119 countries, at least three of ten respondents 
could not answer basic questions about the information security practices of 
their organizations. PRICEWATERHOUSE COOPERS, SAFEGUARDING THE 
CURRENCY OF BUSINESS: FINDINGS FROM THE 2008 GLOBAL STATE OF 
INFORMATION SECURITY STUDY 2 (2008). Thirty-five percent did not know the 
number of security incidents in the last year; 44% did not know what types of 
security incidents presented the greatest threats to the company’s most 
sensitive information, assets and operations; 42% could not identify the source 
of security incidents; 67% said their organization does not audit or monitor 
compliance with the corporate information security policy—whether the attack 
was most likely to have originated from employees (either current or former), 
customers, partners or suppliers, hackers or others. Id. at 15. 
 61. See, e.g., Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, Chronology of Data Breaches, 
http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/ChronDataBreaches.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 
2009). 
 62. See, e.g., Kim Zetter, Google Hackers Targeted Source Code of More 
Than 30 Companies, WIRED, Jan. 13, 2010, 
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/01/google-hack-attack/ (last visited 
May 7, 2010). 
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most sophisticated of technology companies are immune from 
penetration by a driven group of attackers. Each breached 
record is attached to a company or a consumer potentially 
harmed by the disclosure. As the negative publicity following 
information security breaches at companies such as the TJX 
Companies63 and Heartland64 demonstrates, mismanagement 
of information systems can dramatically undercut the efforts of 
a company to build a trusted human face with the outside 
world. 
Meaningful enterprise-wide oversight is necessary to 
create a culture of information security. Returning to the case 
study of the securities industry, although major players in the 
securities industry have experienced data breaches in the last 
five years,65 some of these entities appear to have failed to 
acknowledge the importance of information security. Of the 
brokerages that have experienced breaches few, if any, have an 
officer-level position dedicated to information management. 
Chief information officers and chief security officers are usually 
missing from their rosters of officers. Meanwhile, these same 
entities increasingly rely on technology to replace humans in 
making trading decisions. 
Approximately only three percent of the trading volume on 
the NYSE is done by means of traditional “open outcry” trading 
with humans; 97% of NYSE trades are executed using 
electronic communication networks.66 Trading floors, in the 
opinion of some experts, remain in existence only for show, as a 
relic of prior trading times to pose for news cameras.67 In the 
last three or so years, trading reliant on computer algorithms 
                                                          
 63. Mark Jewell, TJX Breach Could Top 94 Million Accounts, MSNBC, 
Oct. 24, 2007, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21454847/ (last visited May 7, 
2010). 
 64. Jaikumar Vijayan, Heartland Data Breach Could Be Bigger Than 
TJX’s, INFOWORLD, Jan. 21, 2009, 
http://www.infoworld.com/article/09/01/21/Heartland_data_breach_could_be_bi
gger_than_TJXs_1.html (last visited May 7, 2010). 
 65. For example, both Goldman Sachs and UBS have filed charges against 
former employees stealing code from proprietary trading platforms. Katherine 
Heires, UBS Charges 3 Ex-Employees with Code Theft, SEC. INDUSTRY NEWS, 
July 14, 2009, http://www.securitiesindustry.com/news/-23668-1.html (last 
visited May 7, 2010). 
 66. See Jon Stokes, The Matrix, but with Money: the World of High-Speed 
Trading, ARS TECHNICA, July 28, 2009, http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/news/2009/07/-it-sounds-like-something.ars (last visited May 7, 2010). 
 67. Id. 
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has dramatically increased:68 high frequency trading accounts 
for approximately 60% of trading volume, and this number is 
expected to rise.69 Average daily volume has increase by 164% 
since 2005, according to the NYSE, because of the activities of 
“a handful” of traders.70 Some commentators believe serious 
concerns exist over whether the practice of high frequency 
trading itself might be a market manipulation,71 and case 
studies show that the prices of shares purchased by other 
“slow” traders are influenced in a detrimental manner to make 
more profit for the high frequency trader.72 According to an 
NYSE Euronext official, over 90% of orders submitted to the 
New York Stock Exchange by firms using high-frequency 
trading are canceled.73 Others insist that high frequency 
trading is a desirable practice that enhances market exchanges. 
The SEC has opened an investigation into the practice.74 
Regardless of which position one accepts, what is 
indisputable is that the information security of the transactions 
and the management of the machines performing them create 
potential for serious market disruption and provide an 
attractive target for information criminality. In a business 
environment where even the most sophisticated technology 
companies fall victim to information criminals compromising 
their source code,75 the securities industry is certainly not 
                                                          
 68. Kristi Oloffson & Stephen Gandel, High-Frequency Trading Grows, 
Shrouded in Secrecy, TIME.COM, Aug. 5, 2009, 
http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1914724,00.html#ixzz0hiZW
3PDT (last visited May 7, 2010). 
 69. High-Frequency Trading Surges Across the Globe, SYDNEY MORNING 
HERALD, Dec. 2, 2009,    http://www.smh.com.au/business/highfrequency-
trading-surges-across-the-globe-20091202-k5yw.html (last visited May 7, 
2010). 
 70. See, e.g., Charles Duhigg, Stock Traders Find Speed Pays, in 
Milliseconds, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2009, at A17. 
 71. Id. (describing how slow trading firms were subject to different prices 
because of high frequency trading activities by other firms). 
 72. See, e.g., id. 
 73. Jonathan Spicer & Herbert Lash, Who’s Afraid of High-Frequency 
Trading?, REUTERS, Dec. 2, 2009, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN173583920091202 (last visited May 7, 
2010). 
 74. David Scheer, SEC Probes Manipulation by ‘Advanced Trading 
Systems’(Update 1), BLOOMBERG, Sept. 10, 2010, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&sid=aGenyVbVDd2A 
(last visited May 7, 2010). 
 75. For example, Google was recently targeted by a highly sophisticated 
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immune from information security risks. Further, as a whole, 
because of the current shallowness of the information security 
talent pool, it is also likely to be less skilled in defending itself 
than would be a sophisticated technology company.76 
As the previous discussion of the Books and Record Crisis 
articulated, the securities industry reflects a history of 
problematized information handling. However, whereas the 
previous information problems of the Crisis were driven by 
internal inadequacies, now the information threats are driven 
in part by external criminals. Hackers have successfully stolen 
sensitive information from securities firms, including logins 
and social security numbers, and have executed unauthorized 
trades, in at least one case worth over $700,000.77 In fact, the 
list of entities that have experienced information security 
breaches during the last five years includes firms engaged in 
high frequency trading.78 Although some firms’ business relies 
in significant part of computerized trading, firms engaged in 
high frequency trading do not always have a Chief Security 
                                                          
group of hackers who sought to gain access to its source code and that of 
approximately thirty other companies. See, e.g., Zetter, supra note 62. 
 76. When attempting to find qualified candidates to staff information 
security management positions, the current candidate pool is not large due to 
the demands of the field. For a discussion of the qualifications of information 
security management professionals, see, for example, Jessica Twentyman, 
How Can IT Experts Make a Successful Move to a Career in Information 
Security?, SC MAGAZINE, Feb. 25, 2010, http://www.scmagazineuk.com/how-
can-it-experts-make-a-successful-move-to-a-career-in-information-
security/article/164504/ (last visited May 7, 2010). There is also a general 
perception among technology professionals that working in research and 
development in a technology company is “cooler” than working for a financial 
services company, where their influence on corporate policy and products may 
be limited or information security may be a low priority. 
 77. The SEC recently instituted an enforcement action against LPL 
Financial after hackers obtained clients’ unencrypted names, addresses and 
social security numbers, compromising the logon passwords of 14 financial 
advisers and four assistants. The SEC fined LPL $275,000 and required that 
LPL strengthen its security safeguards with respect to customer information; 
the hacker(s) placed, or attempted to place, more than $700,000 in trades in 
securities of nineteen different companies. LPL Financial Corp., Exchange Act 
Release No. 58515, Investment Advisor Act Release No. 2775, 94 SEC Docket 
170 (Sept. 11, 2008), available at www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2008/34-
58515.pdf. 
 78. See, e.g., Kim Zetter, FBI: Russian Programmer Stole Stock-Trading 
Secret Code, WIRED, July 6, 2009, 
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/07/aleynikov/ (last visited May 7, 
2010). 
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Officer or Chief Information Officer with technical expertise to 
meaningfully assess quality of their code and their information 
risk.79 Meanwhile, source code for at least three proprietary 
high frequency trading platforms has already been stolen by 
rogue insiders,80 and other points of vulnerability almost 
certainly exist in these systems. Computer code is never 
perfect. 
All computer systems are vulnerable to security problems 
and attacks, including trading systems.81 A skilled attacker on 
a vulnerable system can sometimes cause the owners of those 
systems to lose control of their machines.82 In light of the high 
volume of trades that rely on the integrity of high frequency 
trading platforms, an injection of rogue code into a single 
proprietary high frequency trading platform could have a 
meaningfully negative impact on the market. Unraveling the 
millions83 of trades of a high frequency platform gone haywire 
across the world’s markets84 could cause disruption to not only 
the firm using the corrupted platform itself but the markets as 
                                                          
 79. For example, despite Goldman Sachs’s recent information security 
breach, based on the Goldman Sachs website as of this writing, no executive-
officer-level position focused on information security risk appears to exist in 
their governance structure, and no background information in the current 
executive officers management team points to computer science expertise 
sufficient in this author’s opinion to generate an impression of adequate skill 
to meaningfully oversee high frequency trading operations. See, e.g., Goldman 
Sachs, Our People: Executive Officers, http://www2.goldmansachs.com/our-
firm/our-people/leadership/executive-officers.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2010). 
In a market where 97% of trading is computer mediated, it can be argued that 
this is a significant management deficit. 
 80. See, e.g., Katherine Heires, Code Green: Goldman Sachs & UBS Cases 
Heighten Need to Keep Valuable Digital Assets from Walking Out the Door. 
Millions in Trading Profits May Depend on It., SEC. INDUSTRY NEWS, July 20, 
2009, http://www.securitiesindustry.com/reports/19_75/-23696-
1.html?zkPrintable=true (last visited May 7, 2010); David Kravets, Second 
Banker Accused of Stealing High-Frequency Trading Code, WIRED, Apr. 20, 
2010, 
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/04/bankerarrested/#ixzz0nEvwPB6u 
(last visited May 7, 2010). 
 81. See Stokes, supra note 66. 
 82. See, e.g., Ryan Naraine, Patch Tuesday Heads-Up: 8 Bulletins, 5 
Critical, ZDNET (Apr. 9, 2009, 11:06 AM), 
http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=3116. 
 83. High frequency traders frequently trade thousands of shares each 
millisecond. See, e.g., Duhigg, supra note 70. 
 84. High frequency trading is increasingly international. See, e.g., High-
Frequency Trading Surges Across the Globe, supra note 69. 
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a whole. Share price changes do not happen in a vacuum; other 
firms will have traded on the market information that resulted 
from the tainted high frequency trades. 
Particularly if we consider these information security 
failures in historical context—in the context of an industry 
known to have a history of deficient recordkeeping and 
management practices that have already once caused the 
multi-billion dollar Books and Records Crisis in our 
markets85—market integrity concerns arise. There is reason to 
question whether stringent information security practices are 
in place with respect to these companies’ proprietary trading 
platforms. Additionally, some of the companies engaging in 
high frequency trading and making markets are private 
companies not subject to extensive SEC oversight.86 High 
frequency trading with inadequate information security 
presents a meaningful risk of market instability, potentially 
with FAILS surpassing even the billions of dollars of “fails” of 
the Books and Records Crisis period.87 
Thus, the securities industry demonstrates the 
unsustainable tension of many corporate cyborgs: while seeking 
to generate feelings of trust in consumers and striving to put 
forth a human face on their enterprises through spokespeople 
such as the popular character of the eTrade baby,88 the last five 
years demonstrate a dramatic shift in the industry toward 
eliminating humans from the equation in favor of reliance on 
autonomous and automated computer systems. The rise of high 
frequency trading as a dominant trading strategy is the 
product of the cyborg transformation in the industry, and its 
dangers loom large beneath the technologies’ surfaces and the 
companies’ anthropomorphic exteriors. 
                                                          
 85. See Wells, supra note 36, at 203. 
 86. Just as the Crisis caused a recalibrating of power in the securities 
industry in favor of a technocracy where only the strong survived, another 
such wave of technocratic purging may be in its nascence. See, e.g., Liz Moyer 
& Emily Lambert, The New Masters of Wall Street, FORBES, Sept. 21, 2009, at 
40, 41 http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2009/0921/revolutionaries-stocks-getco-
new-masters-of-wall-street.html (last visited May 7, 2010). 
 87. Wells, supra note 36, at 203. 
 88. The eTrade baby’s advertising confederates are the subject of a recent 
commercial misappropriation lawsuit by actress Lindsay Lohan. See, e.g., 
Kieran Crowley, Lindsay Lohan Wants $100M over E-Trade Ad, N.Y. POST, 
Mar. 9, 2010, at 5. 
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IV.  INFORMATION ACCOUNTABILITY 
In the previous sections, this article has introduced a 
fundamental tension between the human face and the 
computerized innards of today’s corporation. It has argued that 
both historical examples and current practices evidence 
significant potential for harms to arise from mismanagement of 
this tension. In other words, a deficit in information 
accountability exists. 
The law has been slow to drive meaningful improvements 
to this information accountability deficit. Although the data 
breach notification regime which currently exists in over forty-
five states significantly raised awareness of the risks of 
information vulnerability, the level of information care inside 
enterprises has not necessarily dramatically improved. In fact, 
as the capabilities of the systems they use increase, the 
information risks that pertain to them become more 
substantive. As such, the tension between external and 
internal corporate identity will continue to escalate. 
A larger reconsideration of the bodies of law governing the 
intersection of companies and information technology is 
warranted. Such a reconsideration includes updating multiple 
traditional bodies of law to reflect the changed technology 
reality of today’s companies—corporate law, securities law, 
contract law, intellectual property law, tort law, and criminal 
law. 
A.  CORPORATE LAW 
Two important shifts are needed in corporate law to 
address the regulatory challenges presented by today’s cyborg 
corporations. First, the law needs to acknowledge that the 
value of corporate information assets is generated at least in 
part through their economic and social embeddedness. Thus, 
corporate law needs to acknowledge the interweaving of 
information privacy from the consumer side and information 
security from the corporate side. Data collection is a choice that 
brings with it technology risks; it is not a necessity. Because 
consumers cannot foresee future corporate uses of their 
information or accurately assess the skill of companies’ 
information management, they rely on the expertise of the data 
holders to protect them from harm. For example, databases of 
information about consumers and their preferences are 
corporate assets but, by definition, remain connected to the 
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human subjects of that data. If mishandled, these databases 
can harm the consumers whose data resides in them. Those 
companies that choose to aggregate and share this information 
should be deemed to owe a legal duty of stewardship to the 
subjects of the data collection.89 It is common that in situations 
where consumers place their trust in a specialized service 
provider that the law creates a type of regulated industry or 
registration regime. For example, in Delaware, over forty 
various professions are regulated under Title 24 of the 
Delaware Code because each presents unique risks to 
consumers.90 So too the law should approach companies that 
engage in information processing. 
Second, as I have argued elsewhere,91 the rise of internal 
corporate mechanization and the corresponding heavy reliance 
on intangible assets requires the law to rethink fiduciary 
duties. Fiduciary duties need to shift toward a paradigm of 
ongoing management rather than their current focus on limited 
oversight of extraordinary transactions.92 
B.  SECURITIES LAW 
Although the Sarbanes-Oxley Act took steps to recognize 
the importance of information integrity in an organization with 
respect to financial statements, its more aggressive posture 
                                                          
 89. A parallel might be drawn to a researcher being obligated to protect 
the identities and data of human subjects in her research. 
 90. The Division of Professional Regulation in Delaware regulates the 
following professions: accountancy, realtors, landscape architects, architects, 
real estate appraisers, podiatrists, mental health counselors, chemical 
dependency professionals, chiropractors, funeral service providers, pilots, 
veterinarians, dentists, psychologists, electricians, geologists, adult 
entertainment, speech/language pathologists, audiologists, hearing aid 
dispensers, doctors, dieticians, nutritionists, respiratory care professionals, 
social workers, acupuncturists, manufactured home installers, 
plumbing/heating/ventilation/air conditioning/refrigeration professionals, 
cosmetologists, barbers, nursing home providers, occupational therapists, 
massage and bodywork professionals, optometrists, boxers and sparring 
exhibition providers, pharmacists, possessors of controlled substances, 
physical therapists, land surveyors, private investigators, private security 
agencies, bail enforcement agents, pawnbrokers, secondhand dealers and 
scrap metal processors. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit 24, §§ 101–5505 (2005 & Supp. 
2008). 
 91. See Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Imagining the Intangible, 34 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 965, 967 (2009). 
 92. Id. Specifically, the duty of good faith and the duty of care should be 
modified to include concerns over ongoing management of intangible assets. 
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towards audit of information assets has not, in practice, gone 
far enough with respect to information care. As the discussion 
of the securities industry in earlier sections highlights, 
information handling practices leave room for improvement 
even at the most sophisticated companies. Specifically, 
securities law can be strengthened in at least two ways: first, 
mandating CIOs or CISOs for all public companies and 
financial services providers within the SEC’s regulatory reach, 
and second, clarifying materiality standards for disclosure of 
information security breaches and risks. 
First, the SEC should mandate that every public company 
and financial services provider within its regulatory reach must 
designate a chief information officer or chief information 
security officer, granting such position meaningful decision-
making authority to oversee information handling inside the 
company as a whole. Just as the Health Insurance Portability 
and Accountability Act required that all covered entities create 
an officer-level position to consider the privacy implications of 
the health data that the entity controls,93 so too securities law 
should approach concerns over information handling among all 
public companies and financial services providers. In a world 
where 97% of trading on leading exchanges is done computer to 
computer,94 and particularly in circumstances where an 
organization is experimenting with technology-driven practices 
such as high frequency trading, an officer level pool of experts 
with adequate technological training to meaningfully oversee 
and internally audit (and attest to the quality of) these 
practices should be mandatory. Further, the SEC should devote 
serious study to the systemic information inequalities95 and 
new risks that technology mediated practices such as high 
frequency trading introduce into the system. The potential for 
malicious actors to partially destabilize our markets through 
compromised computer code in trading platforms is a real 
threat and such a large scale attack is, perhaps, merely a 
matter of time. 
Second, the SEC should clarify requirements with respect 
to the materiality of disclosing information security breaches 
                                                          
 93. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), 42 
U.S.C. § 1320d et seq., 
 94. Stokes, supra note 66. 
 95. Granting rights to some but not other players to co-locate servers may 
present technology equity concerns. 
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inside public companies. As I have argued elsewhere,96 
disclosure practices of companies with respect to information 
security breaches and risks vary even within the same 
industry. Further, the diminished value of their assets 
following a data breach may not always be reflected in lowered 
share price in the market. The SEC must take a more 
aggressive lead in creating a culture of information 
accountability in our markets. 
C.  THE RELATIONSHIP AMONG INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, 
CONTRACT LAW, TORT LAW AND CRIMINAL LAW 
The internal mechanization of companies increases their 
reliance on technology and intangible assets. This reliance also 
means that companies’ interest in aggressively protecting their 
intellectual property increases in tandem. As a consequence, 
they now sometimes rely on more proactive contract, tort and 
criminal law postures when they perceive their intellectual 
property to be at stake, emboldened by the uncertainties of the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act97 and the Computer Fraud 
and Abuse Act,98 in particular. This strategic shift requires 
clarifying the balance among intellectual property, contract, 
tort and criminal law. 
While working to maintain a trusted human face, 
companies progressively shift new risk onto their customers 
and employees through contract and related legal approaches. 
Contracting practices demonstrate new knowledge imbalances 
between drafters and consumers and have become 
progressively more imbalanced in favor of the drafter over 
time.99 Rights of recourse upon breach are being interpreted in 
different manners by different courts. In practice, consumers 
lack any meaningful ability to negotiate contracts for most 
digital products and services; the law should rebalance the 
                                                          
 96. See Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Material Vulnerabilities: Data Privacy, 
Corporate Information Security, and Securities Regulation,. 3 BERKELEY BUS. 
L.J. 129, 173–83 (2005). 
 97. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 5, 17, 28 and 35 U.S.C.). 
 98. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006). 
 99. See, eg., Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Chapter 4: Mutually Assured 
Protection: Development of Relational Internet Data Security and Privacy 
Norms, in ANUPAM CHANDER ET. AL., SECURING PRIVACY IN THE INTERNET 
AGE (2008). 
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power balance in the relationship away from the corporate 
drafter. 
Although the companies employing or providing various 
technologies should know about any risks associated with their 
use, they sometimes fail to adequately test these products100 or 
perceive themselves to lack a duty to disclose risks of use in 
detail meaningful to users.101 For example, since the adoption 
of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, companies frequently 
rely on digital rights management (DRM) technologies to 
protect their intellectual property. These DRM technologies 
sometimes make alterations to users’ systems in ways that 
aren’t apparent to users; these changes are sometimes neither 
technologically transparent nor clear from the way the 
contracts governing use of the product describe the DRM. As I 
have argued elsewhere,102 this shift toward greater information 
parity can occur in part through creation of a more robust 
construction of consent, one predicated on a reasonable digital 
consumer standard. Similarly, though not all courts currently 
enforce privacy policies as contracts, privacy policies should 
indeed be enforced as contracts, and their breach should 
provide basis for a breach of contract action and damages. This 
approach, when coupled with data breach notices, would offer 
one method for recourse in instances of information 
mismanagement. Blanket protection from contract damages 
and tort liability for digital products and services creates 
incentives for lack of care on the part of companies. 
Further, many companies do not consider themselves 
obligated to address or mitigate the digital harms that arise 
                                                          
 100. Recently, Google’s Buzz product caused uproar among consumers and 
privacy groups when, after only internal testing, the product was launched. In 
its initial incarnation, Google Buzz incorporated users’ Gmail contacts by 
default in an opt-out model.  An FTC complaint and at least one civil suit have 
been filed in the United States, and Canada’s privacy commissioner has asked 
for an explanation of the company’s conduct. See, e.g., Thomas Claburn, Google 
Buzz Stung by Lawsuit, INFORMATIONWEEK, Mar. 8, 2010, 
http://www.informationweek.com/news/security/privacy/showArticle.jhtml?arti
cleID=223200135 (last visited May 7, 2010). 
 101. One such incident involved digital rights management code used by 
Sony in connection with music discs. See, e.g., J. Alex Halderman & Edward 
W. Felten, Lessons from the Sony CD DRM Episode, 15 PROC. USENIX 
SECURITY SYMP. 1, 1 (2006), available at 
http://cse.umich.edu/~jhalderm/pub/papers/rootkit-sec06.pdf. 
 102. See Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Technoconsen(t)sus, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 
529, 566 (2007). 
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from use of their products or services. As I have also argued 
elsewhere,103 a reasonable expectation of code safety should be 
created with respect to licensors of digital products, as should a 
duty to protect, correct and update problematic or vulnerable 
code. The “harm” that arises in such a situation is in part the 
failure to warn. 
However, when considering the digital harm itself rather 
than a failure to warn, complicating questions can arise when 
considering a civil remedy for information mismanagement, 
particularly with respect to quantifying damages and the 
relationship with criminal law. In some cases, plaintiffs allege 
that a breach of contract can lead to both a tort based remedy 
and, potentially, a criminal prosecution. A circuit split 
currently exists on questions regarding the intersection of 
employment contacts, information breaches and civil and 
criminal computer intrusion.104 Just as in tort and criminal law 
generally, what constitutes an intrusion or an unwanted 
technological “touching” of a user’s machine is contingent 
entirely on user consent. The language used by computer 
intrusion statutes revolves around “interception,” i.e. 
monitoring without consent, and “exceeding authorized access,” 
meaning surpassing the extent of consent.105 Two federal 
statutes, as well as a patchwork of state statutes, use this 
framework of consent in the context of criminal and civil 
computer intrusion – the Electronic Communications Privacy 
Act106 (ECPA) and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.107 The 
                                                          
 103. See Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Hidden Engines of Destruction: The 
Reasonable Expectation of Code Safety and the Duty to Warn in Digital 
Products, 62 FLA L. REV. 109, 136–45 (2010). 
 104. See LVRC Holdings LLC. v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1137 (9th Cir. 
2009) (holding employee use of employer information does not constitute 
violation of Computer Fraud and Abuse Act). But see Int’l Airport Ctrs., LLC 
v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 421 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding employee use of employer 
information constitutes violation of Computer Fraud and Abuse Act). 
 105. See infra notes 106 & 107. 
 106. Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 18 U.S.C.). 
ECPA is composed of Title I, amendments to the Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. A. §§ 
2510–2522 (West 2000 & Supp. 2009), and Title II, the Stored 
Communications Act, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2701-2711 (West 2000 & Supp. 2009). 
Generally, the Wiretap Act prohibits interception of communications, 
including those in transient storage. “Except as otherwise specifically provided 
in” the Act, “electronic communication[s],” which are defined expansively, may 
not be “intercepted.” § 2511(1)(a). An exception is provided for electronic 
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balance among these four legal regimes – intellectual property, 
contract, tort and criminal law – and the meaning of “consent” 
must be crafted carefully to avoid turning mere breaches of 
contract into a basis for criminal prosecutions. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
This article has argued that a progressive transformation 
has occurred in companies: today’s companies reflect a hybrid 
machine and human existence – a type of corporate cyborg 
identity. Anthropomorphized entities reliant on their computer 
                                                          
communication service providers, but it only applies to “activity which is a 
necessary incident to the rendition of [the] service or to the protection of the 
rights or property of the provider of that service.” § 2511(2)(a)(i). The Stored 
Communications Act restricts accessing communications that reside in a 
particular system. The U.S. Patriot Act clarified at least one existing possible 
ambiguity in the language of the Stored Communications Act, explicitly 
including voicemail messages under its coverage. Uniting and Strengthening 
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct 
Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, 283 
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2006)). The Stored Communications 
Act’s main criminal provision reads as follows: “(a) Offense. -- Except as 
provided in subsection (c) of this section whoever-- (1) intentionally accesses 
without authorization a facility through which an electronic communication 
service is provided; or (2) intentionally exceeds an authorization to access that 
facility; and thereby obtains, alters, or prevents authorized access to a wire or 
electronic communication while it is in electronic storage in such system shall 
be punished. . . .” 18 U.S.C.A. § 2701(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2009). The Stored 
Communications Act contains an explicit “provider” exception: “Subsection (a) 
of this section does not apply with respect to conduct authorized -- (1) by the 
person or entity providing a wire or electronic communications service.” § 
2701(c). It has been argued that this § 2701(c)(1) establishes almost complete 
immunity for a service provider that “obtains, alters, or prevents authorized 
access to” e-mail that is “in electronic storage” in its system. See Fraser v. 
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 107, 114-15 (3d Cir. 2003) (“[W]e read § 
2701(c) literally to except from Title II’s protection all searches by 
communications service providers.”). A second provision of the Stored 
Communications Act prohibits “a person or entity providing an electronic 
communication service to the public [from] knowingly divulg[ing] to any 
person or entity the contents of a communication while in electronic storage by 
that service.” § 2702(a)(1). This provision also has service provider exceptions, 
permitting a provider to give access to an electronic communication “to a 
person employed or authorized or whose facilities are used to forward such 
communication to its destination,” § 2702(b)(4), or “as may be necessarily 
incident to the rendition of the service or to the protection of the rights or 
property of the provider of that service,” § 2702(b)(5). Some confusion exists 
regarding the interaction of the two statutes and certain potential definitional 
ambiguities. Most recently the interaction of the two parts of the ECPA was 
discussed in United States v. Councilman, 418 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2005). 
 107. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006). 
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systems, today’s companies rely heavily on intangible assets. 
Because of this reliance, they use and experiment with 
technological advancement. Sometimes this experimentation is 
done imprudently. Thus, today’s cyborg companies introduce 
new types of technology risks and exacerbate pre-existing 
tensions in law. Using historical and modern examples from 
the securities industry, this piece has argued in favor of 
crafting a regime of information accountability: changes to 
corporate, securities, intellectual property, contract, tort and 
criminal law are needed to address these new risks that 
accompany today’s corporate cyborgs. 
 
